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and positive perspectives (pp. 428-30). Svensson’s
paper is rich in both analytical and practical con-
tent and provides insights that can be usefully
pondered by all students of monetary policy
analysis.
It is our belief, nevertheless, that the paper
seriously overstates the relative attractiveness of
targeting rules, from both normative and positive
perspectives, and describes inaccurately the prop-
erties of instrument rules. The purpose of the
present paper is to develop this argument. As a
major part of our argument, we study in detail
one concrete and important claim of Svensson’s
regarding interest rate variability induced by
instrument rules with strong feedback. In the wide
variety of cases considered, we find all results to
be inconsistent with the claim.
The outline of the present paper is as follows.
Section 2 presents explanations of the basic con-
cepts and an introduction to the issues. Section 3
1 INTRODUCTION
I
n the recent literature on monetary policy
analysis, several writers have emphasized
the distinction between instrument rules—
i.e., formulae for setting controllable instrument
variables in response to current conditions—and
targeting rules, as proposed by Svensson (1997,
1999).1 In a major contribution, Svensson (2003)
has presented a sophisticated and comprehensive
case for the use of targeting rules, arguing that
“monetary-policy practice is better discussed in
terms of targeting rules than instrument rules”
(2003, p. 429).2 The superiority of targeting rules
is, moreover, claimed to pertain to both normative
Svensson (2003) argues strongly that specific targeting rules—first-order optimality conditions
for a specific objective function and model—are normatively superior to instrument rules for the
conduct of monetary policy. That argument is based largely on four main objections to the latter,
plus a claim concerning the relative interest-instrument variability entailed by the two approaches.
The present paper considers the four objections in turn and advances arguments that contradict
all of them. Then, in the paper’s analytical sections, it is demonstrated that the variability claim
is incorrect, for a neo-canonical model and also for a variant with one-period-ahead plans used by
Svensson, providing that the same decisionmaking errors are relevant under the two alternative
approaches. Arguments relating to general targeting rules and actual central bank practice are also
included. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, September/October 2005, 87(5), pp. 597-611.
1 See, for example, Svensson (1997, 1999, 2003), Svensson and
Woodford (2005), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), Clarida, Galí,
and Gertler (1999), Cecchetti (2000), Giannoni and Woodford
(2003a,b), Jensen (2002), Walsh (2003), and Woodford (2003).
2 In what follows, quotations with page-number citations but no
author or year indication, refer to that paper, i.e., Svensson (2003).
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 then takes up, and disputes, four particular criti-
cisms of instrument rules that are central to the
argument in Svensson (2003), after which
Section 4 does the same for two additional criti-
cisms. In Sections 5 and 6, the paper turns to the
precise analytical claim mentioned above and
develops results in a number of settings that show
it to be incorrect. Finally, Section 7 provides a
brief recapitulation.
2 BASIC IDEAS AND 
TERMINOLOGY
What is the distinction between instrument
and targeting rules? A rule of the former type
refers, quite simply, to some formula prescribing
settings for the monetary policymaker’s instru-
ment as a function of currently observed vari-
ables. Well-known examples include the Taylor
rule (1993), several interest rate rules studied by
Henderson and McKibbin (1993a,b), and the
activist monetary base rules of McCallum (1988)
and Meltzer (1987). Precisely which variables
are observable is, of course, a matter that can be
debated in practical analyses, but is one on which
the analyst has to take some explicit position.
Note that expectations (based on current infor-
mation) of present or future variables may be
among the variables that the instrument in the
rule responds to.3
The definition of targeting rules is somewhat
more complex. There has been some evolution
since Svensson’s (1997, 1999) introduction of the
concept,4 but his current terminology recognizes
both general and specific variants. Basically, a
general targeting rule is the specification of a
central bank objective function,5 whereas a spe-
cific targeting rule is an optimality condition
implied by an objective function together with a
specified model of the economy (pp. 448-60).6
Initially, optimization was presumed to be of the
discretionary type, with period-by-period reopti-
mization based on prevailing initial conditions,
but in Svensson (2003) the possibility of optimiza-
tion from a “timeless perspective” (see Woodford,
1999) is also considered.
It is not our intention to argue that analysis
with instrument rules is in all respects preferable
to the use of targeting rules. Even if we held that
belief, moreover, we would not think it socially
desirable for all researchers to employ the same
approach. Nevertheless, we are more attracted to
analysis with instrument rules than with target-
ing rules and believe that a few words should be
included to indicate why—especially since
Svensson’s numerous writings argue so strongly
in favor of the targeting rule position.
As a matter of terminology, it seems inappro-
priate to refer to the specification of the policy-
maker’s objective function as a rule. Obviously,
for a given objective function, desirable instru-
ment settings—i.e., policy actions—can be very
different under the same prevailing conditions,
depending on the policymaker’s preferred model
or models of the economy. There are words avail-
able to describe policymakers’ objectives—for
example, “policymakers’ objectives”—so there is
nothing analytical to be gained by referring to them
as “general targeting rules.” It is terminologically
useful, rather, for objectives and rules to be clearly
distinguished. Also, from the substantive per-
spective, the adoption of an objective function is
innocuous if the function accurately represents
the central bank’s true preferences. But if it does
not represent the true preferences and is made
public, as in the scheme suggested in Svensson’s
Section 5.3.3, then the central bank will be describ-
ing its objectives dishonestly to the public, a
McCallum and Nelson
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3 In cases in which expectations are based on current-period infor-
mation, however, Svensson refers to this type of policy rule as an
“implicit instrument rule.”
4 In particular, only specific (not general) targeting rules were con-
sidered in Svensson (1997) and they were called “target rules.”
5 Svensson (2003, p. 430) further requires that these be “operational
objectives” (italics in original), i.e., numeric targets for particular
variables, rather than a general concept such as “price stability.” 
6 Svensson has explained to us that he does not require that a spe-
cific targeting rule necessarily expresses an optimality condition,
as he has in the past (1997, p. 1136), and his definition on p. 429
conforms to that explanation. On p. 430, however, he states that
“specific targeting rules essentially specify operational Euler equa-
tions.” Also, on p. 455 Svensson states that “a specific targeting rule
specifies a condition…[that] may be an optimal first-order condition,
or an approximate first-order condition.” In the remainder of this
paper, accordingly, we shall follow Svensson’s practice by typically
treating specific targeting rules as first-order optimality conditions.practice that seems inconsistent with Svensson’s
emphasis on transparency.7
The most critical problem with specific target-
ing rules—i.e., first-order optimality conditions—
is that they are obviously model-dependent.8 By
construction, the coefficients and variables that
appear in these rules are always closely related to
the precise specification of private sector behav-
ior in the associated model—and thus to the
assumptions made regarding the parameters and
dynamics of the model’s IS, Phillips curve, and
any other key structural equations. It is unclear
which portion of today’s macroeconomic models
are most questionable, but it is entirely clear that
there is much dispute among leading scholars
concerning the proper specification of several
of the crucial relationships. Yet a condition that
implies policy optimality in one model may be
highly inappropriate under other specifications.
Consequently, an attractive approach to policy
design, promoted, for example, by McCallum
(1988, 1999), is to search for an instrument rule
that performs at least moderately well—avoiding
disasters—in a variety of plausible models. In
other words, it is our belief that it is unwise to
restrict policy analysis to optimal-policy exercises,
which will typically be optimal only for the single
model being used. Yet such analysis is precisely
what is contemplated by focus on specific target-
ing rules.
A good illustration of the model-dependence
of optimality conditions is provided in a recent
paper by Levin and Williams (2003), which is a
follow-up to the robustness study of Levin,
Wieland, and Williams (1999). The initial exper-
iments of Levin and Williams (2003) calculate the
consequences of using a policy rule, designed to
be optimal in one model, in other models. The
three models in their introductory example are
(i) a “New Keynesian” baseline model (NKB) that
is highly prominent in recent theoretical research,
(ii) an alternative specification (denoted FHP) with
more sources of inertia used by Fuhrer (2000), and
the empirically oriented model of Rudebusch
and Svensson (1999, RS hereafter). Suppose a
specific targeting rule is optimal in a calibrated
version of the NKB model, with a loss function
that assigns output gap variability a weight of λ
(as in Section 5) and also gives interest rate vari-
ability a weight of 0.1, both in relation to inflation
variability relative to target. If that optimality
condition is used instead in the FHP model, the
loss values are 95 or 150 percent higher (for λ
values of 0.0 and 0.5, respectively) than the min-
imum loss in that model. Even more strikingly, if
this NKB optimality condition is transferred to the
RS model, the combination generates explosive
oscillations—an “infinite” percentage deteriora-
tion. Next, a specific targeting rule that is optimal
in the FHP model produces losses that are 173
percent or 130 percent greater than the minimum
loss in the NKB model and explosive oscillations
in the RS model. Finally, a rule that is optimal in
the RS model generates analogous loss increases
of 219 percent or 254 percent in the NKB model
and 146 percent or 128 percent in the FHP model.
As an extension of our position, we would
suggest that it is not desirable always to limit
analysis to cases in which an explicit objective
function has been specified. Explicitness is itself
a virtue, of course, other things equal. But it is
unclear what terms actually appear in central
banks’ objective functions and what weights each
term receives. It is also unclear what weights and
terms should appear, since there is professional
disagreement over proper model specification.9
Accordingly, it can be useful to explore the way
in which different properties of a modeled econ-
omy (e.g., variances of key endogenous variables)
are related to policy rule parameters, leaving it
to actual policymakers to assign the relevant
weights. Examples of this approach appear in
some of our previous papers (e.g., McCallum and
Nelson, 1999a,b), as well as in Bryant, Hooper,
and Mann (1993).
McCallum and Nelson
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7 Svensson has informed us that he would have the central bank
explain the discrepancy between its objective function and prefer-
ences to the public. We consider that such a need reflects a sub-
stantial degree of nontransparency.
8 The existence of model dependency is recognized by Svensson
(p. 450).
9 Our position does not deny the attractiveness in principle of basing
policymaker objective functions on the preferences of individual
agents.3 FOUR MAIN OBJECTIONS
After some preliminary discussion, Svensson
considers the case of central bank commitment to
an optimal instrument rule (which he terms an
implicit reaction function when the rule includes
any current endogenous variables) and concludes
that the implied approach is “completely imprac-
tical.” Indeed, Svensson states that “commitment
to an optimal instrument rule has no advocates,
as far as I know” (p. 439). With this particular
judgment we have no serious disagreement; see
McCallum (1999, pp. 1490-95), for example. Con-
sequently, Svensson moves on to consideration
of simple instrument rules (pp. 439-41), with one
subsection entitled “Problems of Commitment to
a Simple Instrument Rule” (pp. 441-44). We now
examine that subsection’s arguments in some
detail, since they evidently constitute the most
important ingredients of Svensson’s position. 
In the subsection in question, there are four
main objections to instrument rules that are iden-
tified and discussed. The first is “(1) the simple
instrument rule may be far from optimal in some
circumstances” (p. 441). In particular, “[a] first
obvious problem for a Taylor-style rule…is that,
if there are other important state variables than
inflation and the output gap, it will not be opti-
mal…For a smaller and more open economy
[than the U.S.], the real exchange rate, the terms
of trade, foreign output, and the foreign interest
rate seem to be the minimal essential state vari-
ables that have to be added” [for the rule to be
optimal] (p. 442). But Taylor rules do not com-
prise the entire class of simple instrument rules;
nominal income growth rules provide just one
obvious counterexample. Thus, the foregoing is
not actually an argument against simple instru-
ment rules, but merely an objection to one par-
ticular class. Furthermore, it is not clear that the
supposed departure from optimality resulting
from the absence of the other state variables, per-
taining to open economies, is quantitatively or
even qualitatively important. Indeed, in Clarida,
Galí, and Gertler’s (2001) small open-economy
model there are no additional terms in the welfare
function beyond the two Taylor-rule state vari-
ables—inflation and the output gap—provided
that the former is defined in terms of domestic-
goods price inflation. Similarly, the McCallum-
Nelson (1999a, 2000b) open-economy model can
be formulated entirely in terms of consumer price
index (CPI) inflation, output, and the real interest
rate, with openness changing only the interpre-
tation of the model parameters.
“A second problem,” Svensson states, “is that
a commitment to an instrument rule does not
leave any room for judgmental adjustments and
extra-model information…” (p. 442). This claim
is difficult for us to understand, since there seem
to be various ways in which judgmental adjust-
ments to instrument rule prescriptions could be
made. For example, the interest rate instrument
could be set above (or below) the rule-indicated
value when policymaker judgments indicate that
conditions, not adequately reflected in the central
bank’s formal quantitative models, imply different
forecasts and consequently call for additional
policy tightening (or loosening). This way of incor-
porating judgment is not the same as the one
proposed by Svensson, which he represents by
the inclusion in the structural equations of the
central bank’s macroeconomic model of an unob-
servable exogenous stochastic variable that is not
generated by a simple process, such as “an exoge-
nous autoregressive process” (p. 433). These
exogenous deviations appear in the model’s struc-
tural equations. “Judgment” is then the central
bank’s estimate of these deviation variables. But
it is unclear that this approach reflects the only,
or even the best, way of representing the role of
judgment in policymaking.10 Thus the fact that
the above-mentioned way of incorporating judg-
ment is different from Svensson’s seems to be
beside the point—that is, it does not justify his
quoted statement.11 What is crucial is that judg-
ment can be incorporated into instrument rules
as well as targeting rules.
McCallum and Nelson
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10 Svensson also states that “a commitment to a simple instrument
rule does not provide any rules for when discretionary departures
from the simple instrument rule are warranted” (p. 442). But a
procedure that did do this would hardly seem to reflect what most
analysts would think of as “judgment.” It would be, rather, a com-
plex rule.
11 We do not mean to deny that Svensson has insightful and construc-
tive observations to make regarding incorporation of judgment;
our objection is to the asymmetry that he paints with respect to
such incorporation by means of targeting and instrument rules.Svensson suggests that “a third problem with
simple instrument rules would seem to be that a
once-and-for-all commitment to an instrument
rule would not allow any improvement of the…
rule when new information about the transmis-
sion mechanism, the variability of shocks, or the
source of shocks arrives” (p. 442). But the words
“would seem” appear in the foregoing quotation
because Svensson does not actually make the
foregoing argument. After mentioning it, he goes
on to recognize that Woodford’s (1999) “timeless
perspective” type of commitment does permit
modification of rules when new information is
developed.12 Such rules can, in a manner that is
indicated below, be implemented by means of an
instrument rule. Furthermore, the implied type
of commitment—to a procedure rather than a
formula—could also be applied to other types of
instrument rules.
Finally, switching from a normative to a pos-
itive point of view, Svensson states that “an obvi-
ous fourth problem is that commitment to a simple
instrument rule is far from an accurate descrip-
tion of current monetary policy” as practiced by
inflation-targeting or other central banks. He con-
tinues: “No central bank has (to my knowledge)
announced and committed itself to an explicit
instrument rule” (p. 444). But, as we have argued
previously (McCallum and Nelson, 2000a, p. 15),
no actual central bank has announced or commit-
ted itself to an explicit objective function, which
is a necessary condition for either the general or
specific type of targeting rule promoted by
Svensson.13 Indeed, commitment to an optimal
specific targeting rule would in addition entail
commitment to be bound by the output of a new
optimal control exercise, conducted with a par-
ticular quantitative macroeconomic model, each
decision period (e.g., each month). Such exercises
could, Svensson says, be modified by judgment.
But are they actually conducted by the central
banks that he identifies as the world’s leaders in
this regard, those of the United Kingdom, New
Zealand, and Sweden? If so, what is the value of
the weight λ on output gap variability announced
and used by each of these central banks? What is
the specification of the model used?
In short, it seems appropriate to conclude
that all four of the objections to instrument rules
emphasized by Svensson are equally applicable—
or equally inapplicable—to targeting rules.
4 ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS
Two other debatable points deserve some brief
attention before we turn to a major analytical
issue in Sections 5 and 6. One of these concerns
Svensson’s argument against the view that “simple
instrument rules fit actual central-bank behavior
well” (p. 444). In opposition to this idea, Svensson
states that “even the best empirical fits leave one
third or more of the variance of changes in the
[interest instrument] rate unexplained.” In this
regard it is important to note that the statement
pertains to the variability of first differences of
the interest rate, as found in the study by Judd
and Rudebusch (1998). In terms of levels, the frac-
tion of the variance that is unexplained is approx-
imately 0.02 (i.e., about 2 percent).14 Neither of
these measures is conceptually “correct” or
“incorrect,” of course, but to put matters in per-
spective, we note that 33 percent would be a com-
paratively small unexplained variance fraction
for the first difference of most important variables
in typical quarterly macroeconometric models.
In the well-known Rudebusch and Svensson
(1999) model, for example, the unexplained vari-
ance fractions for changes in inflation and the
output gap are about 71 percent and 87 percent,
respectively.15
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12 For discussions, see Woodford (1999) and Svensson and Woodford
(2005).
13 Note that at a minimum it would be necessary for the central bank
to state explicitly its value for the objective function parameter
labeled λ below and in Svensson’s equation (2.2).
14 Judd and Rudebusch (1998, p. 14) report a residual standard devi-
ation of 0.27 for the Greenspan period 1987:Q3–1997:Q4. Over that
span, the standard deviation of the quarterly average funds rate is
1.93 (annual percentage units). Thus, the unexplained fraction of
variability is (0.27/1.93)2 = 0.0196.
15 These figures pertain to the model’s “inflation equation” and “out-
put [gap] equation,” for which the reported residual standard errors
are, respectively, 1.009 and 0.819 (Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999,
p. 208). The sample standard deviations for first differences of the
relevant inflation and output gap series over the 1961:Q1–1996:Q2
sample period are, respectively, 1.197 and 0.877, so we have
(1.009/1.197)2 = 0.711 and (0.819/0.877)2 = 0.872. Our second point concerns Svensson’s con-
tention that actual central banks noted for their
inflation-targeting regimes, including the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of Canada, and
the Bank of England, use in practice procedures
that are more reasonably characterized by the
notion of a targeting rule rather than an instrument
rule. We have already mentioned that none of
these central banks has publicly adopted an
explicit objective function. But, furthermore, we
find that descriptions of their policy procedures
provided by officials and economists of these
central banks read more like instrument rules
than specific targeting rules.
As a first example, there are several short
articles describing the policy procedures of the
Bank of Canada that appear in the Summer 2002
issue of the Bank of Canada Review. These do not
refer to targeting rules or optimal control exercises,
but discuss instrument rules quite explicitly—
see, e.g., Cote et al. (2002). Another relevant refer-
ence to the use of instrument rules in Canadian
policy is provided by Longworth and O’Reilly
(2002). At the risk of being excessively repetitive,
let it be said explicitly that we do not claim that
the Bank of Canada—or any actual central bank—
strictly follows an instrument rule, but rather that
its practices are closer to the analytical represen-
tation of an instrument rule than to the analytical
representation of a targeting rule. 
For the Bank of England, a natural starting
place is a publication by Bean and Jenkinson
(2001) entitled “The Formulation of Monetary
Policy at the Bank of England,” which describes
the role of forecasts in policy decisions of the
Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee. Their paper’s
discussion explains that a variety of models and
techniques are used in the process, but recognizes
the special status of the “MM” quarterly macro-
econometric model. In the publication Economic
Models at the Bank of England: September 2000
Update, there are several examples of policy
experiments with MM involving alternative
instrument rules (Bank of England, 2000, pp.
13-20). The more recent discussion by Allsopp
(2002, p. 489) suggests that “the broad features
of the reaction function in place in the United
Kingdom increasingly seem to be publicly-
understood and built into expectations.”
A still more recent discussion of the U.K.
policy framework is that in a document prepared
by the U.K. Treasury (2003). This study uses a
comparison of “interest rate decisions [with] those
that a Taylor rule would suggest” as one measure
of whether “the current frameworks…have allowed
monetary policy to perform a stabilizing role”
(pp. 33, 35). By contrast, there is no attempt to
evaluate policy using a numerically specified
loss function or Euler equation. The study does
note criticisms of the instrument rule approach,
citing Svensson (2003) in that regard. But it char-
acterizes the deviation of actual policy from the
Taylor rule as reflecting discretionary adjustments:
“[Prescriptions from] Taylor rules…are typically
different from the actual rates chosen by central
banks, which use discretion to determine rates
based on a wider range of information” (2003,
p. 36). In addition, in a speech accompanying
the release of this study, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer (who sets the target for monetary policy
in the United Kingdom and appoints several of
the members of the Monetary Policy Committee)
was explicit in characterizing actual policy in a
Taylor-rule-like manner: “For a 1 per cent rise in
British inflation, the British interest rate would,
other things being equal, tend to rise by 1.5 per
cent” (Brown, 2003, p. 410).
In the case of New Zealand, descriptions of the
Reserve Bank’s policy procedures (e.g., Hampton,
2002) make no mention of optimal control exer-
cises, but clearly refer to a role for an instrument
rule in their Forecasting and Policy System. In
addition, it is interesting to note that Svensson’s
own extensive and authoritative independent
review of New Zealand monetary policy (2001,
p. 66) suggests that “the Reserve Bank may want
to consider some further developments of its
Forecasting and Policy System. Alternative interest
rate reaction functions and alternative interest
rate paths could be used and presented system-
atically to the MPC [Monetary Policy Committee]
to provide a larger menu of policy choices for
discussions and consideration.”
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INSTRUMENT RULES?
We now turn to our main analytical discus-
sion. Svensson’s subsection 5.5 expresses sharp
and specific disagreement with a crucial argument
made by McCallum (1999, p. 1493) and McCallum
and Nelson (2000a) concerning the relationship
between targeting and instrument rules. In partic-
ular, these two papers argue that an instrument
rule can be written so as to entail instrument
responses that would tend to bring about the satis-
faction of any specific target rule (which usually
amounts to a first-order condition for the maxi-
mization of the central bank’s objective function).
By increasing the response coefficient attached to
the discrepancy between the relevant prevailing
conditions and the desired first-order condition,
the average discrepancy can be made arbitrarily
small.16 Thus, in a sense, one can accomplish with
an instrument rule anything that can be accom-
plished with a specific targeting rule, according
to our argument. Svensson (p. 461) has objected
to this argument, however, on the grounds that
“this is a dangerous and completely impracticable
idea. It is completely inconceivable in practical
monetary policy to have reaction functions with
very large response coefficients, since the slightest
mistake in calculating the argument of the reaction
function would have grave consequences and
result in extreme instrument-rate volatility.” A
similar objection is expressed by Svensson and
Woodford (2005).
Our intuition was that embedding a first-order
condition in an instrument rule with a large but
finite reaction coefficient (such as µ1 below) would
typically entail less-severe instrument movements
than would imposition of the relevant specific
targeting rule, because the latter is equivalent to
use of an “infinite” reaction coefficient. In other
cases, large µ1 values might entail somewhat
greater interest volatility, but in such cases the
magnitude of this volatility would approach that
obtained with the targeting rule as µ1 grows with-
out bound. It is important to note that—in contrast
to Svensson’s suggestion on p. 461—we actually
do not recommend the adoption of a large reaction
coefficient; see McCallum and Nelson (2000a,
pp. 20-24). Our point, instead, is that an instru-
ment rule with a large reaction coefficient is less
open to Svensson’s objection than is its associated
specific targeting rule. In our paper (2000a) we
did not, however, explore the effects of mistakes
in calculating the argument of the reaction func-
tion. In the following paragraphs we shall, accord-
ingly, investigate the validity of Svensson’s
conjecture.
For this exercise, suppose initially that the
economy is represented by the following model,
which is a version of the neo-canonical specifi-
cation used by Bullard and Mitra (2002), Clarida,
Galí, and Gertler (1999), Jensen (2002), Woodford
(1999, 2003), McCallum and Nelson (1999b,
2000a), and many others:
(1)  
(2)  
Here, xt is the output gap, πt is the inflation rate,
δ is a discount factor, and it is the one-period
nominal interest rate. Equation (1) is the now-
familiar expectational IS function and (2) is the
Calvo price-adjustment relation—both consistent
under well-known assumptions with optimizing
behavior by individuals in the economy (e.g.,
Woodford, 2003).
Supposing that the central bank wishes at t
to minimize the loss function17
the optimum first-order condition in the absence
of commitment is πt = –(λ/αx)xt, or
(3) 18
This is the specific targeting rule that is implied
for this model, assuming the absence of commit-
ment, by Svensson’s approach. The corresponding
πλ α tx t x +() = 0.
Etj
j
tj tj x Σ =+ + + () 0
22 ` δπ λ ,
πα δ π ε α δ tx t t t t x x =+ + > < < + E 1 00 1 . ,
xx i tt t r tt t t r =+ − () +< ++ EE 11 0 βπ η β ,
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16 The sign of the response coefficient must, of course, be appropriate—
so that policy is tightened when aggregate demand needs to be
reduced, etc.
17 Up to a scaling term, this is the same objective function as in
Svensson (2003), whose notation we follow.
18 See the papers cited in the previous paragraph. instrument rule proposed in McCallum and
Nelson (2000a) is
(4)
where r – is the average long-run real rate of inter-
est. The term r –, which is included along with πt
so as to express (4) in a Taylor-style form, is nor-
malized to zero by expressions (1) and (2). For
present purposes the interest-rate-smoothing
coefficient, µ2, may also be set equal to zero,
yielding it = πt + µ1[πt + (λ/αx)xt].
To incorporate mistakes of the type contem-





where et represents a stochastic mistake term.
We have included the same mistake term, et, in
both the targeting and instrument rules, a step
that seems necessary to provide a reasonable basis
for comparison. Because the issue is whether use
of an instrument rule (with a large µ1 parameter)
leads to excessive variability (when there are
policy errors) in comparison with the correspon-
ding targeting rule, it would make no sense to
omit the errors from the targeting rule.
In our experiments, we shall treat et as a first-
order autoregressive (AR(1)) process—usually as
white noise—with AR parameter ρe and innova-
tion ωt (standard deviation σω). Various values for
σω and ρe are considered. Behavioral parameter
values for the model are taken to be βr = –0.5, 
αx = 0.03, and δ = 0.99. Also, the stochastic shock
term, ηt, in (1) includes a term, y –
t – Ety –
t+1, where
y –
t is log potential output. This term forms part of
ηt—in addition to a white noise preference shock,
vt—because (1) and (2) are expressed in terms of
the output gap rather than output. The natural rate
value, y –
t, is assumed to follow a first-order auto-
regressive process with AR parameter 0.95 and
innovation standard deviation 0.007. The white
noise preference shock has standard deviation
0.02, and the shock term, εt, in the price adjust-
ir x e i tt t x t t t =− () ++ + () +     {} + − 1 21 2 1 µπ µ π λ α µ ,
πλ α tx t t xe +() += 0
ir x i t tt x tt =− () ++ + ()     {} + − 1 2 12 1 µπ µ π λ α µ ,
ment equation (2) is taken to be white noise with
standard deviation 0.005. For the results given
hereafter, the value of the central bank preference
parameter, λ, is set at 0.1.
We begin by reporting in Table 1 results of
using different values for the feedback parameter
µ1 (setting µ2 = 0 here and in subsequent cases).
The first column of results pertains to the µ1 value
of 0.5, as suggested by Taylor (1993). Successive
columns then use values of 5.0 and 50.0. Finally,
the last column includes results for “µ1 = `,”
that is, for the targeting rule (3′). In each cell, two
values are reported. The first is the unconditional
expected value of the loss function, which is (with
δ = 0.99) 100 times the unconditional expectation
of the single-period loss. The second is the stan-
dard deviation of it, the interest rate instrument.
These values are based on analytical expressions
for the unconditional variances of πt, xt, and it
implied by the model-plus-rule systems.
The first row of cells in Table 1 gives results for
the reference case in which there is no et mistake
term. The pattern is similar to those in McCallum
and Nelson (2000a, Table 4) in that the value of
the loss function with the instrument rule (4′)
approaches the value with the target-rule first-
order condition (3′). Here, however, the it standard
deviation values are also reported. Not surpris-
ingly, they also show the instrument rule values
approaching the targeting rule value smoothly as
µ1 grows without bound. In the second row, the
mistake or error term, et, is included as white noise
with a standard deviation of 0.002. With this small
variability, the results are not much affected. Then,
in the third row, the standard deviation of et is
increased to a magnitude that is similar to that of
the other model shocks. Nevertheless, there is
again no tendency in this case for the large µ1
values to generate poor performance. Indeed, the
variability of it is slightly smaller, with µ1 = 50,
than with the targeting rule holding exactly. (The
same remains true if we set µ1 = 500.) For more-
stringent tests, we increase the standard deviation
of the error term by a factor of ten in the fourth
row and then, in the fifth row, revert to 0.02 for
the innovation standard deviation but with an
autoregressive parameter of ρe = 0.8. In both cases,
the standard deviation of the interest rate increases
slightly as we switch from a large µ1 coefficient
McCallum and Nelson
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targeting rule.
Table 2 repeats the same experiments as in
Table 1, but with the first-order targeting rule and
its analogous instrument rule pertaining to policy
behavior of the “timeless perspective” type of
commitment, rather than discretion.19 In this case,
the optimality condition is 
(5)
and the analogous instrument rule (with µ2 = 0) is
(6)   
when the mistake terms, et, are included. Here
the values and patterns are quite different from
those in Table 1, but the same finding vis-à-vis
Svensson’s conjecture is obtained. There is, in
other words, no tendency for large µ1 values in
ir xx e ttt x t t t =+ + + () − () +     − πµ π λ α 11
πλ α tx t t t xx e +() − () += −1 0
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Table 1
Results with Model (1)-(2), Discretionary Policy, λ = 0.1
Instrument rule (4′) Instrument rule (4′) Instrument rule (4′) Target rule (3′)
µ1 = 0.5 µ1 = 5.0 µ1 = 50 µ1 = `
σω = 0.0 3.70 2.52 2.48 2.48
ρe = 0.0 0.0191 0.0360 0.0397 0.0402
σω = 0.002 3.70 2.53 2.48 2.48
ρe = 0.0 0.0191 0.0360 0.0397 0.0402
σω = 0.02 3.77 2.81 2.83 2.83
ρe = 0.0 0.0198 0.0375 0.0414 0.0419
σω = 0.20 11.02 30.93 37.31 38.16
ρe = 0.0 0.0572 0.1121 0.1240 0.1255
σω = 0.02 4.42 3.58 3.58 3.59
ρe = 0.80  0.0192 0.0361 0.0398 0.0403
NOTE: Entries are loss times 103 and standard deviation of it.
19 This is the type of rule recommended by Woodford (1999, 2003)
and by Svensson and Woodford (2005).
Table 2
Results with Model (1)-(2), Timeless Perspective Policy, λ = 0.1
Instrument rule (6)  Instrument rule (6)  Instrument rule (6)  Target rule (5)
µ1 = 0.5 µ1 = 5.0 µ1 = 50 µ1 = `
σω = 0.0 11.26 2.83 2.30 2.31
ρe = 0.0  0.0336 0.0403 0.0401 0.0401
σω = 0.002 11.27 2.86 2.34 2.33
ρe = 0.0 0.0336 0.0403 0.0401 0.0401
σω = 0.02 11.71 5.99 5.88 5.92
ρe = 0.0  0.0337 0.0403 0.0401 0.0401
σω = 0.20 55.62 319.47 359.99 364.75
ρe = 0.0 0.0449 0.0417 0.0428 0.0430
σω = 0.02 54.37 60.70 59.17 59.05
ρe = 0.80 0.0396 0.0463 0.0460 0.0460
NOTE: Entries are loss times 103 and standard deviation of it.(5) to lead to high it volatility or to poor perform-
ance, in comparison with the specific targeting
rule results of condition (6).
Thus, there appears to be little to choose from
between targeting rules and instrument rules on
the criteria of interest rate volatility and welfare
performance; consistently, the results obtained
from targeting rules emerge as a limiting case of
those obtained from instrument rules. Two other
criteria that we have not considered here for dis-
criminating between policy rules are whether the
rule produces a determinate and learnable rational
expectations equilibrium. Other work, however,
suggests that these criteria do not appear to provide
grounds for favoring targeting rules over instru-
ment rules. Studying these issues with a basic
canonical model and no policy mistakes, Evans
and Honkapohja (2004, p. 19) find that instrument
rules of the kind studied in this section “lead to
both determinacy and stability under learning.” 
6 MODEL WITH PREDETERMINED
OUTPUT AND INFLATION
There are various modifications to the model
(1)-(2) that could be examined20 to determine
whether the foregoing results obtain generally,
but one in particular is of special relevance. This
modification stems from recognition that the
examples in Svensson’s (2003) paper are worked
out in terms of models (pp. 432-35) in which
agents’ actions in period t have no effect on out-
put or inflation until period t+1. Accordingly, we
now modify our model (1)-(2) so as to possess that
property. Thus, consider the following specifica-




πα δ π ε α δ tx t t t t t x x =++ > < < −− + EE 11 1 00 1 . ,
xx i tt t r t tt t t =+ − () + −+ − −+ EE E 11 1 11 βπ η , β βr <0
Here we have used the law of iterated expecta-
tions, for example, Et–1(EtXt+1) = Et–1Xt+1. With
this modification, the optimal discretionary first-
order condition imposed in period t—that is, the
specific targeting rule—becomes
(9)
instead of (3). (See Svensson, p. 452.) Accordingly,
the implied instrument rule with µ2= 0 and r – = 0 is
(10)   
Again the relevant experiment, designed to com-
pare these two approaches in the presence of
policy mistakes, entails specifications with ran-
dom error terms included in both rules. The model





Here the random mistake terms are dated t–1 so
as to respect the notion that output and inflation
in t are predetermined.
Before turning to more-complex cases, we
consider an analytical solution for the simple
special case in which discretion obtains and the
three disturbance terms are all white noise. Then
the minimum state variable solution to the system




With this specification, we have Et–1πt = φ13et–1,
Et–1πt+1 = 0, Et–1xt = φ23et–1, and Et–1xt+1 = 0.
Undetermined coefficient calculations then
yield φ11 = 1, φ12 = 0, φ13 = –αx/[αx + (λ/αx)], φ21 = 0,
φ22 = 1, φ23 = –1/[αx + (λ/αx)], φ31 = 0, φ32 = 0, and
φ33 = –1/βr[αx + (λ/αx)]. 
For comparison, we need to solve with the
instrument rule (12) in place of the targeting rule
(11). The solution is again of the form (13), and
ie tttt =++ − φε φη φ 31 32 33 1.
xe tttt =++ − φε φη φ 21 22 23 1
πφ εφ ηφ tttt e = ++ − 11 12 13 1
ix e t tt tt x tt t =+ + () +     −− − − EE E 11 1 1 1 πµ π λ α .
EE tt x tt t xe −− − +() += 11 1 0 πλ α
ix tt t t t x t t =+ + ()     −− − EE E 11 1 1 πµ π λ α .
EE tt x tt x πλ α ++ +() = 11 0
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20 We have verified that inclusion of serial correlation in the εt shock
process does not alter our basic result.
21 Our specification is equivalent to Svensson’s, in which t+1 is used
wherever we use t, etc.now the undetermined coefficient calculations
yield φ11 = 1, φ12 = 0, φ13 = αxβrµ1/[1 – (1 + µ1)αxβr
– (λ/αx)µ1βr], φ21 = 0, φ22 = 1, φ23 = βrµ1/[1 – (1 +
µ1)αxβr – (λ/αx)µ1βr], φ31 = 0, φ32 = 0, and φ33 = µ1/
[1 – (1 + µ1)αxβr – (λ/αx)µ1βr] > 0. Then to compare
the variability of it under the two types of policy
behavior, we need only to calculate the magnitude
of φ33 for the two cases, since Var(it) = φ33
2 σe
2 in
both cases (where σe denotes the standard devia-
tion of et). But with µ1 > 0, it is just a matter of
algebra to verify that φ33 is smaller in the second
case (i.e., the instrument rule). So again we find
that mistakes involving the first-order optimality
condition are less serious (in terms of interest
rate variability) when the instrument rule, rather
than the corresponding targeting rule, is used.
Also, it is straightforward to verify that, as µ1 → `,
the instrument rule expression for φ33 approaches
the targeting rule expression.
The case just examined is, however, exces-
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Table 3
Results with Model (7)-(8), Discretionary Policy, λ = 0.1
Instrument rule (12)  Instrument rule (12)  Instrument rule (12)  Target rule (11)
µ1 = 0.5 µ1 = 5.0 µ1 = 50 µ1 = `
σω = 0.0, ρe = 0.0 7.03 6.99 6.99 6.99
ρε = 0.0 0.0025 0.0022 0.0021 0.0021
σω = 0.02, ρe = 0.0 7.10 7.27 7.34 7.35
ρε = 0.0 0.0060 0.0108 0.0119 0.0121
σω = 0.2, ρe = 0.0 14.4 35.4 41.8 42.7
ρε = 0.0 0.0539 0.1061 0.1175 0.1189
σω = 0.02, ρe = 0.0 772 779 780 780
ρε = 0.9 0.0841 0.0847 0.0848 0.0849
σω = 0.02, ρe = 0.8 773 780 780 780
ρε = 0.9 0.0840 0.0841 0.0841 0.0841
NOTE: Entries are loss times 103 and standard deviation of it.
Table 4
Results with Model (7)-(8), Timeless Perspective Policy, λ = 0.1
Instrument rule (15)  Instrument rule (15)  Instrument rule (15)  Target rule (14)
µ1 = 0.5 µ1 = 5.0 µ1 = 50 µ1 = `
σω = 0.0, ρe = 0.0 8.58 7.01 6.99 6.99
ρε = 0.0 0.0058 0.0025 0.0022 0.0021
σω = 0.02, ρe = 0.0 9.02 10.2 10.6 10.6
ρε = 0.0 0.0065 0.0027 0.0026 0.0026
σω = 0.2, ρe = 0.0 52.9 324 365 369
ρε = 0.0 0.0304 0.0113 0.0152 0.0156
σω = 0.02, ρe = 0.0 446 308 306 306
ρε = 0.9 0.0392 0.0098 0.0128 0.0131
σω = 0.02, ρe = 0.8 488 362 360 360
ρε = 0.9 0.0444 0.0249 0.0260 0.0261
NOTE: Entries are loss times 103 and standard deviation of it.sively special. Indeed, inspection of the solutions
given above shows that, for the discretionary case
with all white noise shocks, there is no effect of
different µ1 values on the mean value (uncondi-
tional expectation) of the objective function. In
other words, with no source of serial correlation in
the model, and with the existence of an informa-
tion lag, the discretionary policy rule has no stabi-
lizing properties for πt and xt in the model (7)-(8).
Thus we need to consider cases with autocorre-
lated disturbances and/or with timeless perspec-
tive optimization. For the latter case we find, from
Svensson’s equation (5.28), that the relevant target-




In Tables 3 and 4 we report numerical results
with the model (7)-(8). Again we report standard
deviations based on analytical covariances. In
most of the cases, the standard deviation of the
innovations to the policy errors is kept at σω = 0.02.
In Table 3, which pertains to discretionary behav-
ior, the policy specifications are (11) and (12) for
the targeting and instrument rules, whereas, in
Table 4, with timeless perspective behavior, the
relevant rules are (14) and (15). In both tables the
first three rows apply to cases with white noise
shocks, so we see that, as in the analytical solution
just given, policy activism is not helpful in achiev-
ing policy objectives. Indeed, when policy errors
are included, as in rows 2 and 3, the activist rules
tend to be harmful. This should not be greatly
surprising, because there are no general optimality
results pertaining to the formulations being con-
sidered. In the final two rows of each table, seri-
ally correlated shocks are present, however, so
policy activism can potentially be helpful.22
Indeed, in Table 4 we see that larger values of µ1




tt tt x tt tt
=
++ () − () + −− − − − EE E E 11 1 1 2 1 πµ π λ α t t−     1 .
EE E tt x tt tt t xx e −− − − − +() −     += 11 2 1 1 0 πλ α
Be that as it may, with regard to the issue at
hand the results are clear-cut: There is no ten-
dency for the variability of it to grow alarmingly
with large values of µ1. Indeed, in most cases the
variability of it is smaller with large values of µ1
used in the instrument rule than it is with the
associated specific targeting rule. In addition, the
results provided by the targeting rules (11) and
(14) are, as before, very closely approximated by
those of the instrument rules (12) and (15) for
large values of µ1.
7 CONCLUSION
Svensson (2003) argues strongly that general
and specific targeting rules, which amount to
commitments to specified objective functions
and first-order conditions (respectively), are nor-
matively superior to instrument rules for the con-
duct of monetary policy. By contrast, we suggest
that it is unhelpful, terminologically, to refer to
“general targeting rules” as policy rules and that,
substantively, their adoption is either innocuous
or else represents a departure from transparency.
Most of the present paper’s discussion is focused,
accordingly, on specific targeting rules—i.e., the
first-order optimality conditions implied by the
combination of a specific objective function and
a specific model. We argue in Section 2 of this
paper that a key problem with targeting rules is
that they are inevitably fine-tuned to the model
chosen to describe private sector behavior; so,
they may perform poorly in the event that the
chosen model is misspecified. In that respect,
instrument rules, which may rely on more-generic
properties of models used for monetary policy
analysis, may be preferable.
Svensson’s argument that, instead, specific
targeting rules are superior to instrument rules
is based largely on four main objections to the
latter plus a claim concerning the relative interest-
instrument variability entailed by the two
approaches. Our Section 3 considers the four
objections in turn and advances arguments that
contradict all of them. Then, in the paper’s analyt-
ical sections (5 and 6), we demonstrate that the
variability claim is incorrect for a neo-canonical
model and also for a variant with one-period-
22 Where autocorrelation is included in the εt process, the innovation
variance is kept at 0.0052.
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same decisionmaking errors are relevant under
the two alternative approaches. 
We suggest, then, that despite its large quantity
of meticulous analysis, Svensson (2003) does not
develop any compelling reasons for preferring
targeting rules over instrument rules, from a nor-
mative perspective. We also suggest, regarding
the positive perspective, that no actual central
bank has expressed explicitly the magnitude of
objective function parameters that are essential
for the utilization of a targeting rule.
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